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The issue on growth and its variation of intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs is of great interest 
in international economics. This paper examines the determinants of intra-firm trade by shedding 
light, not only on factor price and trade cost, but also on the organizational form in terms of the 
ownership of overseas plants and control over intermediate input for further processing, using 
micro data at the affiliate firm level. In the empirical analysis, since organizational form and 
intra-firm trade are jointly determined, we adopted instrumental variable regression treating the 
choice of a purchasing manager as an endogenous variable. The results suggest that control over 
input decisions critically affects intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the nature of international trade has changed dramatically. Growth of 
world trade has been driven largely by rapid growth of trade in intermediate inputs, such as 
components and equipment. For example, Yeats (2001) found that 30% of world trade in 
manufacturing is intermediate inputs. Hurmels, Ishii and Yi (2001) and Yi (2003) demonstrate 
that a large part of the growth of international trade is explained by vertical fragmentation of 
production, which involves a sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across countries, with 
each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence.   
A large part of trade of intermediate inputs is accounted for by intra-firm trade by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). According to Slaughter (2000), more than 50% of U.S. 
exports are undertaken by U.S. MNEs. And Hanson et al. (2005) reports 93% of exports by U.S. 
MNEs to their overseas affiliates were intermediate inputs. The extent of intra-firm trade varies 
across both industries and countries. As explained by Hanson et al. (2005), intra-firm trade for 
further processing by U.S. affiliates is common among machinery, transport equipment, and 
electronics. U.S. affiliates located in countries with low trade costs and low wages, such as 
Mexico or Canada, are engaged in input processing through intra-firm trade. 
Recently, many economists have stepped forward to explain the growth and its variation of 
intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs. However, traditional trade theory cannot explain the 
choice between intra-firm trade with vertical integration and international outsourcing. Thus, 
researchers are motivated to incorporate the concepts from industrial organization and contract 
theory that explain the organizational form of the firm. 
The objective of this paper is to identify the determining factors affecting intra-firm trade 
by Japanese manufacturing MNEs’ affiliates data. We examine the determinants of intra-firm by 
shedding light, not only on factor price and trade cost, but also on the organizational form in  2
terms of the ownership of overseas plant and control over intermediate input for further 
processing. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces previous studies related to 
the determinants of intra-firm trade; section 3 explains the estimation model and data; section 4 
discusses the estimation results; and a summary of the findings and policy implications are 
presented in the final section. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Our work is built from several related research projects on intra-firm trade. The first one is 
research on trade costs and factor price. For example, Hanson et al. (2005) investigated 
affiliates’ demand for imported inputs based on firm-level cross section data for U.S. MNEs in 
1994. They found that trade costs between the U.S. and host countries, relative wages of 
less-skilled workers and corporate tax rates in host countries have a significant effect on 
intra-firm trade.   
The study on the determinants of intra-firm trade is closely related to the study on local 
procurement. For example, Belderbos et al. (2001) examined the determinants of local 
procurement for Japanese electronics manufacturing affiliates. Using affiliate-level cross section 
data for 1999, they found the quality of infrastructure, the size of local supporting industry and 
local content regulations have a significant effect on local procurement. Kiyota et al. (2008) 
used Japanese foreign affiliate-level panel data set and estimated translog factor demand 
function. They concluded the experience of the affiliates, as measured by the length of operation, 
had a positive impact on local procurement in Asian countries. 
The second body of literature is theoretical or empirical research, which combines 
traditional trade theory with the choice of organizational form. For example, Grossman and  3
Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) take into account property right theory and an 
incentive systems approach to explore trade-off between vertical integration through FDI and 
foreign outsourcing. According to the property rights theory, since an enforceable agreement 
takes place only after investment, relationship-specific investment is distorted. When the 
economic rent of investment is distributed through ex post Nash bargaining, each party’s 
incentive to invest depends on the ownership of the asset, which determines the residual rights 
of control. Generally, to minimize the loss of surplus due to investment distortion, the 
ownership should be given to the agent that is most important in raising surplus. Therefore, if 
the agent’s effort to overall surplus is important, the property rights approach suggests foreign 
outsourcing is better than vertical integration. On the other hand, under the incentive systems 
approach, a principal’s optimal incentive contract is designed to induce effort by managers. 
When perfect monitoring of managers’ effort is not possible, first-level effort cannot be 
achieved. If vertical integration through FDI reduces monitoring cost, it is preferred rather than 
arms-length transaction, namely, foreign outsourcing. 
In case of Grossman and Helpman (2004), they develop a model in which the firms choose 
their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. And they also 
provide the sorting of the firms with different productivity levels into different organizational 
forms. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) investigate the ownership and control structure of firms 
engaged in export-processing in China. They considered two trade modes; pure assembly and 
import and assembly. In the former regime, foreign buyers both own and supply a plant in China 
with inputs. In the latter regime, a plant in China imports inputs of its own accord, processes 
and sells the processed goods to a foreign buyer. According to property the rights approach, the 
control rights over inputs should be given to the local managers when local managers’ effort is 
important. In this case, the ownership of a plant in China and control over inputs are split. By  4
contrast, when managers’ effort is not important, the incentive systems approach implies that 
both ownership and control should be allocated to the foreign firm. They used Chinese Custom 
data which includes processing imports and exports by year, 8-digit HS product, origin or 
destination city-district in China, destination country and customs regime (pure-assembly or 
import-and-assembly) and ownership type (foreign and Chinese-owned). They show that the 
combination of foreign ownership of plants and Chinese managers’ control over input are most 
common and consistent with the property rights approach. 
The third group of studies is research on institutional quality and international trade. 
Concerned with relationship-specific investment and international trade, the importance of 
country-specific institutional differences has received a great deal of attention in recent 
literature. For example, Levchenko (2007) developed a simple model within the framework of 
incomplete contracts and presents institutional differences as one of sources of comparative 
advantage. He also provides empirical evidence of the institutional differences as an important 
determinant of trade flows. Similarly, Nunn (2007) examined institutional comparative 
advantage using a new measure of institutional intensity. He paid much attention to 
relationship-specific investment and constructed the measure of the proportion of intermediate 
inputs that are relationship-specific by products. Global trade pattern was found to be well 
explained by contract enforcement rather than by countries’ endowments of physical capital and 
skilled labor. 
Our contribution is two fold. First, we used affiliates-level micro data, which enabled us to 
control various characteristics of overseas affiliates, including organizational form. Previous 
research such as Hanson et al. (2005) and Kiyota et al. (2008) also used micro data but they did 
not incorporate the organization form. Since organizational form and intra-firm trade are jointly 
determined, we used instrumental variable estimation. Second, we also take into account  5
differences in country specific institutional qualities, which lead to policy implications.   
 
3. Research Design 
As an indicator of intra-firm trade at the affiliates-level, we used the ratio of import from 
headquarter to total purchase for Japanese foreign affiliates. Affiliates-level data have 
advantages in the information on technology level for affiliates, organization form and business 
environment in host countries. Our data source is Kaigai jigyo katsudo kihon (doko) chosa (The 
Survey on Overseas Business and Activities), which is the confidential survey by Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry of Japanese government. We computed intra-firm trade ratio and 
the results are shown in table 1 and 2. 
From table 1, some regional differences can be identified. In 1995, while the intra-firm 
trade ratio for affiliates in North America, South America and Europe was approximately 35%, 
the ratio for China and ASEAN exceeded 50%. Both China and ASEAN have attracted many 
Japanese MNEs due to low labor costs and low trade costs in terms of distance. However, the 
intra-firm trade ratio for China and ASEAN has gradually declined in 1998 and 2001, implying 
improvement of local business environment enables MNEs affiliates to increase local 
procurement and reduce intra-firm trade. 
 
== Table 1  == 
 
Table 2 presents wide variations among industries. While the intra-firm trade ratio for light 
manufacturing (i.e. textiles) is around 15% to 30% of general machinery, electronics, transport 
equipment, and precision machinery exceeds 35%. Processing these products involves various 
production stages which are separable. And since each stage has different factor intensity, firms  6
may have an incentive to locate labor intensive activities in low wage countries. Among those 
industries, general machinery and transport equipment show a remarkable decrease in the 
intra-firm trade ratio (from 0.43% to 0.35-37%) while the ratio of electronics and precision 
machinery is stable for the period. 
 
== Table 2  == 
 
Various factors might be responsible for the determination of intra-firm trade ratio. 
However, we will focus on the contractibility and nationalities of persons in charge of input 
control. Statistical descriptions suggest that both factors possibly affect the intra-firm trade ratio. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the mean value of intra-firm input purchase ratio of 
foreign affiliates from their parent firms and the contractibility in host countries. As a proxy for 
the contractibility, we used the rule of law index, compiled from global governance indicators 
which increase the quality of the legal environment, and categorized host countries into five 20 
percentile increments of rule of law index. The bar charts in the figure show that intra-firm trade 
ratio is negatively related with the contractibility in host countries, suggesting low transaction 
costs in arm’s-length transactions in the country where the rule of law index is high. 
 
== Figure 1 == 
 
The simple bar chart in Figure 2 shows the mean value of intra-firm input purchase ratio of 
foreign affiliates from their parent firms by the nationality of purchasing manager. Although the 
mean ratio is almost the same between the two in 1995, the significant difference is found in 
1998 and 2001. This statistical difference suggests that an affiliate with a local purchasing  7
manager is likely to procure intermediate input from local suppliers. We will further explore the 
relationship between differences in organizational form and intra-firm trade, as well as other 
determining factors in the following section. 
 
== Figure 2 == 
 
 
3.1 The determinant of Intra-firm trade: the Hypotheses 
In this subsection, we discern the determining factor for intra-firm trade ratio. In the 
analysis, we divide the possible explanatory factors into three groups, namely (1) trade cost and 
factor price, (2) institutional quality, and (3) organizational form, measured by the nationality of 
managers who are in charge of input control. 
First, we note market specific factors including the trade cost and factor price in the host 
country. Hanson et al. (2005) found that vertical production networks of U.S. MNEs are 
sensitive to less-skilled labor costs and trade costs between the U.S. and host countries using 
imported input data at the firm-level. As shown in table 1 and 2, Japanese MNEs also appear to 
engage in processing imported intermediate inputs in the countries where labor and trade costs  
are lower such as China and ASEAN, and the processing products using imported inputs 
concentrate on industries with various production processes including labor intensive activity. 
Following the earlier empirical evidence, we test the following hypothesis on the effect of 
unskilled wages and trade costs on intra-firm trade.   
 
  Hypothesis I: Lower trade costs and unskilled wages encourages intra-firm trade. 
  8
Secondly, we note the contract completeness as an institutional factor in the host country. If 
the legal system in the host country is weak, the transaction cost is high when dealing with 
arm’s-length local suppliers. In such a case, MNEs will choose vertical integration in the market, 
where the cost of a lawsuit is high, in order to avoid holdup costs and intermediate inputs are 
supplied by intra-firm trade. Hence, the hypothesis to identify the factors affecting intra-firm 
trade is presented as follows: 
 
  Hypothesis II: The improvement of contractibility in the host country induces   
    lower costs for its affiliate to transact with local suppliers and in turn     
    decreases the ratio of intra-firm trade of inputs. 
 
Thirdly, as we saw in the previous section, the nationalities of managers who are in charge 
of input control have an impact on intra-firm trade. A similar pattern was found and examined 
by Feenstra and Hanson (2005) using Chinese custom’s distinct trade data. In their setting, input 
search and processing in China requires specific investment by foreign firms and the 
appointment of a local Chinese manager. Effort level for local managers cannot be controlled by 
foreign firms. As we mentioned in section 2, allocation of control rights over input depends on 
how important the local Chinese manager’s effort is. On the one hand, if effort by a local 
manager is essential, control rights over input should be given to the local manager. On the 
other hand, foreign firms or dispatched managers from a headquarter are in charge of input 
control if relationship-specific investment, such as human capital investment, by foreign firms is 
indispensable for processing. In addition, contractibility might affect organizational form. In a 
poor business environment, since the cost of negotiation with a local manager would be 
extremely high, MNEs hesitate to give control rights over input to local managers. In sum, when  9
local manger’s effort is important and the degree of legal enforcement is high enough, control 
rights over input are given to local managers. Meanwhile, when the degree of contractual 
completeness is low or managers’ effort is not crucial, foreign firms maintain both ownership 
and control over input, dispatching a manager from headquarters and increasing intra-firm trade. 
Following from Feenstra and Hanson (2005), the importance of local managers’ effort is 
measured by the value added ratio of each affiliate in our empirical analysis. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is summarized as follows; 
  Hypothesis III: Affiliate firms with a high value added ratio are inclined to be given   
    input control and purchase input from local firms in arm’s-length    
  transactions.   
 
Note that allocation of control rights over input and intra-firm trade are jointly determined. 
We treat a variable for the delegation of control rights over input as an endogenous variable and 
used Instrumental Variable (henceforth IV) regression technique.   
 
3.2 The Determinants of Intra-firm trade: Empirical Specification 
Based on the theoretical conjecture foregone, we test empirically how the firm- specific 
and market- specific factors affect the intra-firm procurement ratio of affiliate firms. The 
equation for estimation is specified as follows: 
 
aijt t jt jt jt jt
jt jt ijt ijt ijt
aijt aijt aijt aijt aijt
rule dist sw unsw
agg agg pRD KL psize
share local asize pm m
ε α β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
13 12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
2 1        (1) 
 
where a denotes the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms i, i is the index for the affiliate’s parent  10
firm, j denotes the host country, and t is the year.  0 α  is a constant,  t α  represents the time 
trend and  aijt ε   is the error term. 
The dependent variable m is the ratio of intra-firm input purchases of foreign affiliates a 
from the parent firm. In order to examine how the modes of organization affect it, we use the 
ownership share share  and a dummy variable pm, (which takes on the value of 1 if the 
nationality of the purchasing manager in charge of input control is local, and 0 if the assigned 
manager is dispatched from the parent firm) as qualitative information on control rights over 
input purchases. 
As other affiliate’s characteristics, asize, and local indicate the number of employees as a 
size of the affiliate and local sales ratio, respectively. We also control parent firm characteristics 
including the number of employees as firm size psize, capital-labor ratio KL and R&D intensity 
pRD. 
Affiliate firms may procure input from other Japanese affiliate firms in the host country 
instead of purchasing from their parent firms. Thus the model includes two agglomeration 
variables presenting the existence of Japanese affiliate firms in the host country, taking into 
account transactions with other affiliates invested by Japan. One is the number of affiliates 
invested by the same parent firm in the host country agg1 and the other one is the number of 
Japanese affiliates in the host country agg2. 
unsw and sw denote the average wage per employee of unskilled and skilled workers, 
respectively, in the host country. These variables are based on wage payment data recorded in 
the affiliate firm-level data. Due to the limited availability of wage data, we defined the average 
wage in textile, wood pulp, leather, printing, and food industries as wages of unskilled workers, 
and that in electrical machinery, transportation machinery, and precision machinery industries as 
wages of skilled workers.    11
For trade costs, we use the distance between capital city in the host country and Tokyo, dist 
compiled from CEPII. As a proxy measurement of the contractibility, the rule of law index, rule 
in the global governance indicators provided by the World Bank Institute, have been adopted.
1 
We also take into account industry specific factors and year specific factors for intra-firm input 
purchases. The estimated equation includes year dummy and 2-digit industry dummy variables. 
Estimation carried out by the tobit model to solve the problem that a large number of affiliates 
record zero value for the ratio of intra-firm trade procurement.   
Organizational form and intra-firm procurement are simultaneously determined. Hence we 
treat the purchasing manager dummy as an endogenous variable. Since the 
instrumental-variables regression assumes that the endogenous variables are continuous and are 
not appropriate for use with discrete variables, we apply a two-step procedure described by 
Wooldridge (2002, pp.623-624). First, we estimate the probit model using the set of regressors 
in the equation for the intra-firm procurement ratio and additional instruments and obtain 
predicted probabilities. In the second step, we estimate the tobit model by IV regression using 
the fitted probabilities as instruments.   
Theoretical conjecture implies that investment level and investment specificity affect 
allocating control rights over input purchases. For additional instruments used in the first step 
estimation, we adopt the value-added ratio and R&D intensity at an affiliate-level as a proxy for 
investment level and specificity, respectively. The affiliate firm’s age is also included in the 
instruments to control a possible vintage effect on control rights decisions. We estimate 
following the probit model using additional instruments in the first step.   
 
                                                  
1  The index is based on hundreds of variables and reflects the views of thousands of citizens, survey 
respondents, and experts worldwide (Kaufmann et al. 2006). This original index ranges from −2.5 to 
2.5 and is indicating that a higher score represents a country with a higher level of the contractibility.    12
e y + + = γZ Xβ
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where X is a set of regressors in equation (1) and Z is a set of additional instruments including 
three variables, value-added over total sales of an affiliate firm, va, R&D intensity, aRD and 
affiliate firm’s age, age. Table 3 shows the data descriptions and the summary of the statistics 
for each variable. The ratio variables are converted to percentage so that the estimation results 
can be interpreted easily. 
 
== Table 3  == 
 
 
3.3. Data Issues 
We used the micro database of Kaigai jigyo katsudo kihon (doko)chosa (The Survey on 
Overseas Business and Activities, hereafter we call SOBA) constructed by Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI). The aim of this survey is to obtain basic information on the 
activities of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. The survey covers all Japanese firms that had 
affiliates abroad. The survey consists of two parts: one is the Basic Survey, which is more 
detailed and carried out every three years; the other is the Trend Survey which is comparatively 
rough and carried out between the Basic Surveys. Major items in the SOBA are establishment 
year, breakdown of sales and purchases, employment, costs, and research and development and 
so forth. Micro-data of the SOBA is available after 1995. However, the volume of intra-firm 
trade is not included the Trend Survey. Thus our samples are restricted to 1995, 1998, and 2001. 
A more detailed description of the data is provided in the Appendix A.  13
 
4. Estimation results 
4.1 Result of Choice Model on Purchasing Manager 
We first estimate the binary response model on the purchasing managers’ dummy using 
regressors in the second step and additional instruments, such as the value added ratio of the 
affiliate firm, and gain the fitted probabilities for an instrument in the IV regression. The results 
of the estimation of the probit model are presented in table 4. Columns (1) and (2) presents the 
results using full observations on affiliates with accurate information on the variables of interest, 
and columns (3) and (4) present the results using a subsample covering only majority-owned 
affiliate firms (>50% ownership share). The statistical significance of explanatory variables is 
almost the same among the estimations except for distance. Thus, we regard the result in 
column (1) as a baseline result. The coefficients of the value added ratio are positive and 
significant as predicted. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction that granting 
input control to a local manager is optimal when the role of the affiliate side is important to the 
value of the relationship. The marginal effect of the value added ratio on the predicted 
probabilities is 0.0026. This result means that the probability of choosing a local manager 
increases 2.6% when the percentage of value added ratio increases by 10 points. Although it was 
predicted that investment specificity is negatively related to granting control over input 
purchases to local, contrary to expectations, the estimated coefficient for the R&D intensity of 
the affiliate firm, which is used as a proxy for investment specificity, is positive and significant. 
The calculated marginal effect is 0.02 and the probability of choosing a local manager increases 
2% when the percentage of R&D intensity increases by 1 point. At the same time, the affiliate’s 
experience in the host country is also positively correlated with choosing a local manager.   
The coefficients of both affiliate’s size and parent firm’s size variables are negatively 
significant. An increase in the capital-labor ratio of a parent firm also leads to the probability of  14
choosing a local manager. However the marginal effects of these firm characteristics are quite 
marginal, considering the magnitude of unit. The two variables indicating agglomeration of 
Japanese firms in the host county are not significantly different from zero. The effects of both 
skilled and unskilled wages are positive. The rule of law index is not correlated with control 
over input purchasing at all, while the distance to the host country is negatively related with 
control as expected, but the relation is not so robust. 
 
== Table 4  == 
 
4.2 Result of Estimation on Intra-firm trade 
In the second step, we estimate the tobit model with IV regression using the fitted 
probabilities obtained from probit estimation as an instrument variable. The results are 
displayed in table 5. To clarify the difference with the case where the purchasing manager 
dummy is treated as exogenous, the results of the tobit model are also displayed.   
 
== Table 5  == 
 
The purchasing manager dummy is not correlated with the ratio of intra-firm procurement 
at all in the tobit model without industry dummies, while negative sign with significance at the 
5% level is found in the model including industry dummies. Interestingly, the estimator is 
changed drastically by the tobit with IV regression. As shown in column 2 and 4, the coefficient 
of the purchasing manager dummy becomes strongly significant and negative.
2 The Wald test 
of exogeneity of the instrumented variable rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. The 
                                                  
2  The estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood estimation. We also gained Newey’s 
minimum chi-squared estimator, but the result does not change.  15
marginal effect is -13, suggesting the ratio of intra-firm procurement of the affiliate firm from 
its parent firm with a local manager for purchasing input is 13 percentage points lower than 
affiliate firms with a Japanese manager. This effect is quite large compared to the effects of 
other factors.   
As proxy for factor price in the host country, two variables, unskilled wages and skilled 
wages, are included in the model. It was predicted that the vertical fragmentation of production 
is common among the countries with low unskilled wages, and the coefficient of unsw shows 
the negative sign and sw shows the positive sign, respectively. Although the former variable is 
not significant, the latter variable is strongly and positively significant. The coefficient of 
distance variable is strongly significant and negative as expected, indicating that the greater the 
transportation cost, the lower the intra-firm trade. 
Another issue is how the rule of law index as a proxy for contractibility in a host country 
influences the intra-firm transaction. Since a high score of the index reflects that the costs of a 
lawsuit are law, it is expected that the rule of law index are negatively related to intra-firm 
procurement ratio. The coefficient of rule is negative and significant as predicted. The marginal 
effect of rule is computed as -3.0 ~ -3.7, which means a 1 score increase in the rule of law index 
is associated with the ratio of intra-firm procurement decreasing by 3 ~ 3.7 percentage points. 
Table 5 also shows the results of other firm- and country-specific factors. With regard to 
the firm size, the parent firm size and the intra-firm procurement seem to be almost unrelated, 
while the size of the affiliate firm is negatively related to the procurement ratio from the parent 
firm. The estimation equation also includes the ownership share in order to control the 
commitment level of the parent firm. Although one might expect that the estimation result may 
be affected by the threshold of ownership share, it was not changeful even if the estimated 
sample is restricted to majority-owned firms (see Appendix B). The ownership share is  16
positively correlated with the intra-firm procurement as expected. The local sales ratio and 
parent firm’s capital-labor ratio show a positive and negative sign, respectively while the 
significance disappeared after controlling industry-specific factors. The coefficient of the parent 
firm’s R&D intensity is found to be positive for the procurement ratio. The marginal effect is 
computed as 0.4 after controlling industry dummies, which means a 1 percentage point increase 
in R&D intensity to total sales of the parent firm, raises the ratio of intra-firm input purchasing 
by 0.4 percentage point. This result suggests that a vertical fragmentation is more common 
among R&D intensive firms in the home country. The result of the number of affiliate firms 
invested by the same parent firm in the host country was found to decrease the procurement 
from a parent firm. On the other hand, the total number of Japanese affiliate firms seem to be 
positively correlated with the procurement from a parent firm, while the statistical significance 
is not observed in the model including industry dummies. One possible explanation for these 
results is that the input procurement from parent firms is likely to be replaced by that from other 
affiliates in the host country, if it exists while a vertical fragmentation of production processes 
are concentrated in the country where the is an amassing of Japanese MNEs.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The issue on the growth and its variation of intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs is of 
great interest in international economics. This paper examines the determinants of intra-firm 
trade by shedding light, not only on factor price and trade cost, but also on the organizational 
form in terms of the ownership of overseas plants and control over intermediate input for further 
processing, using micro data at the affiliate-firm level. In the empirical analysis, since 
organizational form and intra-firm trade are jointly determined, we adopted instrumental 
variable regression, treating a choice of purchasing manager as an endogenous variable. Our  17
empirical examination is the first attempt to control organizational form for explaining 
intra-firm trade.   
We implement a two-step procedure in the empirical analysis proposed by Wooldridge 
(2002). First, we estimate the binary response model on the choice of purchasing manager using 
the set of regressors in the equation for explaining the intra-firm procurement ratio and 
additional instruments. In the second step, we estimate the equation for intra-firm trade by IV 
regression using the fitted probabilities gained from the first step as an instrument variable. In 
the results of the probit model, control over input decisions is positively correlated with the 
value-added ratio of an affiliate firm. This finding is consistent with Feenstra and Hanson 
(2005) who demonstrate that disintegrated ownership and control over input makes sense when 
it is optimal to hold investment incentives to both and find that foreign factory ownership and 
local input control is more common in high value added industry using Chinese data. The results 
of IV regression on intra-firm trade clearly show that the choice of whether granting control 
rights over input purchases to a local manager has a large impact on the procurement of 
intermediate input from Japan after controlling its endogeneity. The contribution of this paper is 
to suggest that control over input decisions critically affects intra-firm trade of intermediate 
inputs. 
We also take into account differences in country specific institutional qualities. The 
introduction of the variable of rule of law index is yet another unique feature of our estimation. 
The result provides evidence that the intra-firm trade of intermediate inputs is strongly and 
negatively affected by the rule of law index. This result leads to policy implications for the host 
country that seek to efficiently increase procurement from local firms. Intra-firm procurement is 
observed in countries with low performance of institutional factors, and in order to boost the 
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Appendix A. Data Description 
This paper used the micro database of Kaigai Jigyo Katsudo Kihon (Doko) Chosa (The 
Survey on Overseas Business and Activities, hereafter we call SOBA) which is a firm-level 
survey by the Research and Statistics Department, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
Government of Japan. The aim of this survey is to obtain basic information on the activities of 
overseas affiliates of Japanese firms. The parent companies are Japanese corporations which, as 
of the end of March, own or have owned overseas affiliates in the past, excluding those in the 
financial and insurance industry or real estate industry. The survey includes various items on 
affiliates’ characteristics such as the establishment year of affiliates, the breakdown of sales and 
purchases, employment, costs, and research and development, and so forth are available. 
Further, to control for parent-firm characteristics, we linked affiliate survey, SOBA with 
firm-level survey, Kigyo Katsudo Kihon Chosa (Basic Survey of Japanese Business Activities 
and Structures, hereafter we call BSJBSA) by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. This 
survey was first conducted in 1991, then in 1994 annually afterwards. The coverage of this 
survey is all firms with more than 50 employees and capitalization of at least 30 million yen for 
mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail and some service sectors. 
We dropped from our sample set those manufacturing affiliates whose primary activities 
are not “production.” Since SOBA dose not request respondents to report a breakdown list of 
their shipment, industry classifications are not always reliable. In fact, there are many affiliates 
who belong to the manufacturing sector, but have an extremely low value added ratio. Probably, 
these affiliates might mainly engage in wholesale activates but report their industry 
classification as the manufacturing sector. Fortunately, the survey has qualitative inquire on 
current and future of their primary activities; “production”, “research and development”, 
“wholesale”, “retailing” and so forth. We restrict our sample to those affiliates who belong to  21
manufacturing sector and report its current primary activates as “production.”   
 
Appendix B. Estimation Results on Majority-owned firms   
Dependent variable: Intra-firm








Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects
-0.998 -20.792 -9.463 -0.713 -26.539 -12.709
[1.596] [10.316]* [1.526] [11.170]*
-0.293 -0.375 -0.170 -0.353 -0.462 -0.221
[0.089]** [0.101]** [0.086]** [0.102]**
0.026 0.046 0.021 -0.006 0.026 0.012
[0.022] [0.025] [0.022] [0.027]
0.306 0.253 0.115 0.252 0.185 0.088
[0.054]** [0.062]** [0.051]** [0.062]**
0.013 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.009 0.004
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008]* [0.009]
-0.023 -0.059 -0.027 0.017 -0.021 -0.010
[0.027] [0.033] [0.028] [0.034]
1.069 1.202 0.545 0.538 0.611 0.292
[0.249]** [0.266]** [0.258]* [0.275]*
-0.452 -0.453 -0.205 -0.547 -0.478 -0.228
[0.205]* [0.212]* [0.208]** [0.222]*
0.047 0.037 0.017 0.039 0.017 0.008
[0.016]** [0.017]* [0.020]* [0.023]
-0.11 0.67 0.304 0.53 1.52 0.726
[1.209] [1.310] [1.148] [1.287]
4.048 5.191 2.355 5.191 6.613 3.157
[1.698]* [1.847]** [1.633]** [1.832]**
-0.157 -0.144 -0.065 -0.13 -0.111 -0.053
[0.030]** [0.032]** [0.029]** [0.032]**
-6.944 -7.145 -3.241 -8.6 -8.868 -4.233
[1.621]** [1.675]** [1.556]** [1.651]**
-0.705 -0.196 -0.089 -2.914 -2.23 -1.064
[2.977] [3.083] [2.838] [3.022]
-5.33 -3.754 -1.702 -6.622 -4.522 -2.158
[2.964] [3.164] [2.840]* [3.139]
Constant 33.785 48.019 46.241 64.988
[7.170]** [10.407]** [7.382]** [11.197]**
Observations 2388 2388 2388 2388
Pseudo R2  0.0057 0.0209
Wald test of exogeneity
chi2(1) =     3.78
Prob > chi2 =
0.0518
chi2(1) =     5.47
Prob > chi2 =
0.0193
Log likelihood -12150.669 -11939.787
Yes No No Yes




N of Japanese affiliates in the
host country
Unskilled wage in the host
country
Skilled wage in the host country
Distance (100km)
N of parent firm's employee
(100 persons)
Parent firm's Capital-Labor ratio
Parent firm's R&D intensity (%)
N of affiliates invested by same
parent firm in the host country
Purchasing manager dummy
(local=1)
N of affiliate's employee (100
persons)







Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, ** indicate significance at the 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Observations include 241 left-censored observations, 2039 uncensored 




Table 1. Distribution of intra-firm trade ratio over industries 
By  Region  1995 1998 2001 
North America  0.371    0.344  0.328 
South America  0.324    0.341  0.314 
Europe 0.349    0.319  0.346 
Oceania 0.418    0.250  0.215 
ASEAN 0.406    0.360  0.337 
NIES 0.385    0.374  0.331 
China 0.562    0.487  0.406 
Other Asia  0.465    0.434  0.366 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of intra-firm trade ratio over industries 
By  Industry  1995 1998 2001 
Textile  0.241 0.155 0.293 
Chemical  0.279 0.302 0.274 
Primary  Metal  0.407 0.474 0.346 
Metal  Products  0.399 0.419 0.379 
General  Machinery 0.435 0.368 0.372 
Electronics  0.438 0.418 0.416 
Transport  0.424 0.387 0.349 









Table 3. Data descriptions and summary statistics 
 
Variable  Data discription  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
m 
Intra-firm imports from Japan / total 
purchase (%) 
34.90 32.39    0  100 
pm 
The nationality dummy of person in charge 
of input control (Japan =0: Local = 1) 
0.63 0.48   0  1 
va  Affiliate's Value added / Sales (%)  38.36  19.76    0  99.97 
aRD  Affiliate's R&D intensity (%) 0.38  1.82    0  49.88 
age  Affiliate's Age (year)  11.71  8.91    0  48 
asize  N of affiliate's employee (100 persons) 4.44  8.56    0  159.29
local  Affiliate's Local sales ratio (%)  63.58  37.46    0  100 
share  Ownership share (%)  79.48  25.09    0  100 
psize  N of parent firm's employee    (100  persons) 71.75  122.02   0.55   711.70 
pRD  Parent firm's R&D intensity (%)  30.86  30.93    0  510.76 
KL  Parent firm's Capital-Labor ratio 3.52  3.28    0  40.52 
agg1 
N of affiliates invested by same parent firm 
in the host country 
3.01 4.44   1  33 
agg2  N of Japanese affiliates in the host country  43.09  49.34    1  227 
unsw 
Average wage of unskilled worker in the 
host country 
0.79 0.95   0  5.27 
sw 
Average wage of skilled worker in the host 
country 
0.93 0.98   0  4.88 
dist  Distance  (100km)  58.14  37.20   11.58   183.74 
rule  Rule of Law index (0~5)  3.09  0.87    1.59    4.58 
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Table 4. Results of choice model on purchasing manager 
Dependent variable: pm Purchasing
manager dummy (local=1)
Additional instruments Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects
0.007 0.00266 0.007 0.00243 0.007 0.00253 0.006 0.00228
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
0.053 0.01956 0.051 0.01872 0.053 0.02055 0.053 0.02017
[0.020]** [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.021]*
0.014 0.00526 0.015 0.00570 0.015 0.00580 0.016 0.00621
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
-0.015 -0.00553 -0.015 -0.00564 -0.014 -0.00553 -0.015 -0.00570
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
0.002 0.00064 0.003 0.00094 0.002 0.00093 0.003 0.00122
[0.001]* [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
-0.010 -0.00368 -0.01 -0.00371 -0.006 -0.00246 -0.007 -0.00251
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.002]** [0.002]**
-0.001 -0.00023 -0.001 -0.00027 -0.001 -0.00026 -0.001 -0.00032
[0.000]* [0.000]** [0.000]* [0.000]**
-0.003 -0.00115 -0.003 -0.00104 -0.004 -0.00161 -0.004 -0.00141
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
0.019 0.00715 0.005 0.00193 0.016 0.00613 0.004 0.00141
[0.008]* [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
-0.001 -0.00027 0.007 0.00253 0.004 0.00142 0.012 0.00442
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
-0.001 -0.00023 -0.001 -0.00055 -0.001 -0.00036 -0.002 -0.00073
[0.001] [0.001]* [0.001] [0.001]*
0.108 0.04022 0.109 0.04031 0.121 0.04637 0.127 0.04882
[0.043]* [0.044]* [0.046]** [0.047]**
0.229 0.08501 0.228 0.08441 0.168 0.06457 0.17 0.06525
[0.057]** [0.059]** [0.062]** [0.065]**
-0.114 -0.04254 -0.129 -0.04761 -0.086 -0.03317 -0.103 -0.03946
[0.054]* [0.056]* [0.059] [0.061]
0.000 0.00009 0.001 0.00026 0.001 0.00038 0.001 0.00045
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.032 -0.01181 -0.038 -0.01418 0.014 0.00522 0.009 0.00349
[0.090] [0.093] [0.107] [0.111]
0.084 0.03120 0.080 0.02942 0.14 0.05369 0.132 0.05044
[0.091] [0.095] [0.107] [0.112]
Constant 0.775 0.840 0.332 0.449
[0.207]** [0.230]** [0.263] [0.291]
Observations 3006 3006 2388 2388








Industry dummy No Yes
Distance (100km)
Rule of Law index (0~5)
Year dummy 1998
Skilled wage in the host country
Parent firm's R&D intensity (%)
N of affiliates invested by same
parent firm in the host country
N of Japanese affiliates in the host
country
Unskilled wage in the host country
Affiliate's Local sales ratio (%)
Ownership share (%)
N of parent firm's employee  (100
persons)
Parent firm's Capital-Labor ratio
Affiliate's Value added / Sales (%)
Affiliate firm's R&D intensity (%)
Affiliate's Age (year)
N of affiliate's employee (100
persons)
 
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, ** indicate significance at the 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  25
Table 5. Results of intra-firm trade ratio 
Dependent variable: Intra-firm
imports from Japan / total
purchase (%)
Tobit[1] Tobit[2]
Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Coefficients Marginal effects
-2.831 -25.668 -11.329 -2.909 -28.645 -13.336
[1.470] [9.213]** [1.419]* [9.978]**
-0.284 -0.385 -0.168 -0.354 -0.467 -0.215
[0.082]** [0.094]** [0.080]** [0.094]**
0.027 0.043 0.019 0.003 0.028 0.013
[0.020] [0.022]* [0.020] [0.024]
0.306 0.222 0.097 0.277 0.185 0.085
[0.031]** [0.046]** [0.030]** [0.047]**
0.013 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.007 0.003
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
-0.06 -0.091 -0.040 -0.013 -0.042 -0.020
[0.023]** [0.027]** [0.024] [0.028]
1.356 1.527 0.668 0.768 0.855 0.394
[0.227]** [0.246]** [0.239]** [0.254]**
-0.588 -0.622 -0.272 -0.58 -0.549 -0.253
[0.188]** [0.196]** [0.192]** [0.202]**
0.066 0.058 0.025 0.049 0.032 0.015
[0.015]** [0.016]** [0.018]** [0.020]
0.077 0.908 0.397 0.433 1.295 0.597
[1.142] [1.232] [1.094] [1.201]
3.141 4.879 2.135 4.22 6.038 2.783
[1.547]* [1.750]** [1.491]** [1.719]**
-0.141 -0.135 -0.059 -0.129 -0.116 -0.053
[0.026]** [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.027]**
-6.487 -6.946 -3.040 -7.568 -8.083 -3.726
[1.466]** [1.534]** [1.416]** [1.503]**
-4.773 -4.517 -2.881 -6.542 -6.271 -1.973
[2.488] [2.588] [2.388]** [2.520]*
-9.175 -7.87 -3.956 -10.059 -8.605 -3.438
[2.503]** [2.653]** [2.413]** [2.608]**
Constant 36.344 56.091 47.192 69.163
[5.620]** [9.785]** [5.847]** [10.411]**
Observations 3006 3006 3006 3006
Pseudo R2  0.0093 0.0221
Wald test of exogeneity
chi2(1) =     6.33
Prob > chi2 =
0.0119
chi2(1) =     6.83
Prob > chi2 =
0.0090
Log likelihood -14914.676 -14688.519
IVTobit[1] IVTobit[2]
N of parent firm's employee
(100 persons)
Parent firm's Capital-Labor ratio
Purchasing manager dummy
(local=1)
N of affiliate's employee (100
persons)
Affiliate's Local sales ratio (%)
Ownership share (%)
Parent firm's R&D intensity (%)
Unskilled wage in the host
country
Rule of Law index (0~5)
Distance (100km)
N of affiliates invested by same
parent firm in the host country
N of Japanese affiliates in the
host country




Industry dummy No No Yes
 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; *, ** indicate significance at the 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Observations include 387 left-censored observations, 2490 uncensored 
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Figure 1. Intra-firm trade ratio and contractibility in host countries 
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Figure 2. Intra-firm trade ratio by the nationality of purchasing manager and year 
Note: “Local” means that the nationality of purchasing manager is local while “Japan” means 
that the purchasing manager is dispatched from Japan.   
 
 
 